Author: Admin

  • Delete / Ignore: What Counts as ‘Waste’ and ‘Work’ in the New Global Politics of Disposability

    Delete / Ignore: What Counts as ‘Waste’ and ‘Work’ in the New Global Politics of Disposability

    This is a text version of a keynote talk I was invited to give at an international symposium at York University in April 2026. I have included images of my slides that accompanied my talk. My talk was about thinking through what counts as ‘waste’, what counts as ‘work’ in what the symposium’s organizers called the ‘new global politics of sustainability’ (read more here).

  • Experiments with ‘local AI’

    Experiments with ‘local AI’

    Featured image: “Wow”. Deborah Lupton / https://betterimagesofai.org / https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

    Introduction

    I’m a professor at a public university. My professional life is devoted to scholarship for the public good. Public money makes my professional life possible and makes the results of my scholarship publicly available. In spite of all that, 24 of my articles and three of my books have been absorbed into the training data sets of generative–AI models created by private companies according to a database maintained by The Atlantic  Like so many other authors and artists (and despite copyright), I never consented to have my work included in those models. I could be angry about this–and sometimes I am (cue the sound of me yelling at clouds)–but I also maintain a broader professional interest in the devices being described as “AI”. That broader curiosity is about the ecologies of electronics (all the people, places, and things that need to be brought together for electronics to be made and to work). Those ecologies also include all the pollution and waste that arise from those collections of people, places, and things.

    Given my broader research interests and the non-consensual inclusion of my work into AI data training sets, I figure I have some license to play around with these tools to get a sense of what they do. So I decided to experiment with what is sometimes called ‘local AI’.

    What are artificial intelligence and ‘local AI’?

    The term ‘artificial intelligence’ covers a wide combination of hardware and software devices. When people refer to it today it is usually in relation to natural language processing computer programs, large language models, image generators, or other synthetic media generators. But ‘artificial intelligence’ and ‘AI’ are not new terms. From their earliest days these terms were at least partially about marketing rather than strictly technical ideas (Hao 2025, 90).

    In the early 50s a MIT computer scientist, John McCarthy, submitted a grant proposal for research into “automata studies”. That proposal failed. Undeterred, McCarthy swapped out the term “automata studies”, swapped in “artificial intelligence”, and submitted the proposal to the Rockefeller Foundation. Success!

    A few years later another MIT computer scientist, Joseph Weizenbaum, developed a natural language processing computer program (aka a ‘chatbot’) called, ELIZA. ELIZA was explicitly designed to examine communication between people and machines. ELIZA could run several different styles of chatbots. One of the most famous of those programs was deliberately designed to mimic a kind of psychotherapy. Weizenbaum was surprised, and eventually dismayed, to find out that people using ELIZA had a tendency to imbue the program with human like qualities and treat it as if it were a conscious being. This tendency to anthropomorphize computer programs got dubbed the ELIZA effect (Shall we play a game? You can run a version of ELIZA using a plain old web browser here).

    There have been previous AI booms and busts. Historian Colin Garvey (2018) describes these previous cycles as “broken promises and empty threats”.

    Figure from Garvey, Colin. 2018. “Broken Promises and Empty Threats: The Evolution of AI in the USA, 1956-1996.” Technology’s Stories, ahead of print, March 16. https://doi.org/10.15763/jou.ts.2018.03.16.02.

    I am not a computer scientist, so I have a very shallow understanding about how the machines dubbed ‘AI’ actually work. But, at a basic level these devices use the mathematics of probability to find statistically relevant patterns in the data they have been trained on. If you have ever texted on a smart phone with predictive text, then you have some experience with a version of AI (although a real computer engineer would probably balk at that comparison).

    ‘Local AI’ is what happens when you run an AI application on a device you may have adjacent to you, such as a desktop or a laptop, and all of the computation necessary for running the application happens on that device with no need for an Internet connection nor any processing in some data centre elsewhere. Even under these conditions though ‘local AI’ is ‘local’ only in a very narrow sense. To do the experiments I ran with a few different local AI models I had to get them on my machine in the first place. To do that meant downloading them from the internet. I used Ollama, which is basically a graphical user interface (GUI) for using a range of different AI models on your own device.

    At the time of writing, Ollama and the AI models I used were hosted in a data centre in Kansas City, Missouri while me and my desktop are located in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador (How did I figure that out? By using traceroute and geoIP, the latter created by the lovely folks at the Digital Methods Initiative. See here for the full list of their free tools).

    Getting Ollama and the AI models on to my machine required a network connection from St. John’s, through Toronto, then on to Kansas City and back – about 7,000km round trip. This traceroute is a mere hint at the geographies that make my device ‘local’. There are connections to many other people, places, and things that bring my particular device together and to my desk (see Kate Crawford’s wonderful Anatomy of AI and her excellent book, (Crawford 2021)). Furthermore, what some have called the ‘artificial intelligence data pipeline’ involves ongoing human labour throughout it (see Muldoon et al. 2024). The people doing this work are unevenly distributed across many sites around the world, frequently working in difficult conditions (see the film Humans in the Loop for a sensitive portrayal or The Cleaners for a good documentary on the subject. There’s also a lot of good journalism on the topic (e.g., Booth 2026; Chandran 2026; Dosunmu and Waithira 2025; Koebler 2026; Lepapa 2026)).

    Experiments with Local AI

    My intent was to experiment using my own work and on what I thought was a low stakes task: checking for typos (e.g., grammar errors, spelling, etc.). Pretty much any modern word processor already has these features built in. I just wanted to see if these AI models could handle an already solved problem and, if so, how so, how well, and what that might mean.

    The text that I used is one I have co-authored and is already under review at a journal. In other words, my co-author and I had fully created this text. We collected all the data, did all the analysis, wrote literature review, discussion, and conclusion as well as created all the figures ourselves without any use of ‘AI’. Also, because it is a manuscript that is already submitted for review it had gone through multiple rounds of our own (i.e, human) proofreading/copy editing. But even the most thoroughly copy edited text can still have spelling errors, grammatical errors, and so forth. I wanted to see what value there might be in processing our text through a local AI for dealing with these kinds of fiddly copy editing tasks. Would it find typos that we had missed despite our multiple rounds of copy editing and proofreading? Would this use case suggest other more substantive use cases that local AI might offer me in the future?

    Spoiler alert: the models I experimented with failed spectacularly. But, the results were surprising and fascinating — not due to the failures themselves but how the different models I used failed. Let’s take a look…

    Experiment 1 using OpenAI’s gpt-oss:20b

    The first model I tried is called”gpt-oss:20b” (see: https://ollama.com/library/gpt-oss:20b). This model was developed by OpenAI and is described as bringing, “…a whole new local chat experience, and [is] designed for powerful reasoning, agentic tasks, and versatile developer use cases.” One of the reasons I chose this model was that it promised a user (i.e., me) access to its full chain-of-thought i.e., “…access to the model’s reasoning process, facilitating easier debugging and increased trust in outputs” (https://ollama.com/library/gpt-oss:20b). This language of “chain of thought” is important as is the language output by the model in its chain-of-thought process and output to me, the user. I’ll come back to these language issues in my discussion below about overall lessons learned from my experiment. Here I’m just going to start with the actual experiments that I ran.

    I prompted gpt-oss:20b as follows:

    Prompt: find typos

    The following text is a direct copy/paste of the model’s chain-of-thought output:

    The following text is a direct copy/paste of the model’s output:

    (I paste in the text)

    The following text is a direct copy/paste of the model’s chain-of-thought output after my full text is pasted in:

    The following text is a direct copy/paste of the model’s output:

    Lessons From of Experiment 1 with gpt-oss:20b

    The model fails to answer the prompt I provided (“find typos”) and answers a completely different question: “What does ‘Volumetric Water Benefit Accounting’ aim to achieve?”. The model puts quotations around this question in its chain-of-thought output implying that the model is quoting a sentence from the text I pasted into the prompt box. However, no such sentence exists in the pasted text. There is a superficial resemblance between the framing of the question appearing in the model’s chain-of-thought output and the actual research questions our manuscript is about.

    The model output provides a definition of Volumetric Water Benefit Accounting (VWBA) that is basically correct, but the prompt was not about had been about providing such a definition. The model output is a decent, if decontextualized, plain language (i.e., non-technical) definition of VWBA. Our paper does provide a definition of VWBA, but defining it is not what our paper is about. We provide a definition of VWBA in order to discuss other issues and questions.

    Experiment 2 using OpenAI’s gpt-oss:20b

    Experiment 2 replicated Experiment 1 but with a change to the prompt that included the full text of our paper within the prompt as follows:

    Prompt: Find typos is the following text: [full text of our paper pasted here]

    The following text is a direct copy/paste of the model’s chain-of-thought output:

    The following text is a direct copy/paste of model output:




    Lessons From Experiment 2 with gpt-oss:20b

    Both the chain-of-thought output and the final output from the model are wild! First, neither output has anything to do with the prompt provided which was about finding typos. Notice, for example, the second sentence of the chain-of-thought output reads, “The user says ‘Analyze the article and write a critique of the article, focusing on the following points: …’”. My prompt to the model says nothing about analysis or writing a critique. My prompt was about copy-editing (i.e., ‘find typos’). The results from Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 suggest that the model in question has built-in biases toward certain kinds of use cases predetermined by the model builders and training (e.g., summation; certain kinds of critique that one might encounter in a college/university course or in a peer-review situation). Those built-in biases may have no meaningful connection to an actual prompt by a user (e.g., me).

    The model output that provides the critique is notable in a variety of ways. On a surface level, the output was automatically formatted into a table with columns for “criterion”, “strengths”, “weaknesses”, and ”overall assessment”. These categories would be familiar to people in higher-ed who create assignments for students or who engage in peer reviews (some academic journals ask reviewers to write their assessments using categories like these, sometimes in table format). On a deeper level, this automatic formatting and the content of the critique show very clearly how AI output can pollute academic practice. Here is what I mean: I know what the paper being critiqued by this AI is actually about. The content of the critique shown in the table above is a mishmash of stuff that is in the paper and that has a plausible but inaccurate relationship to what the paper is actually about. There lies real trouble.

    Unless you personally have experience with peer-review the actual practices that go into it are probably opaque, so what follows is just a high-level description of typical practice. At a given journal there may be one or a few editors. As editors they are responsible for things like finding appropriate reviewers for submitted manuscripts and keeping up with all of the communication that entails. Even a journal with a small readership might still receive dozens of manuscripts for consideration. Bigger journals can receive hundreds or even thousands of submissions per year. At some journals, editors may do a very quick desk review to decide whether or not to send a submitted manuscript out for peer-review. That kind of desk review is not about deep or thorough peer-review. It’s about weeding out submissions that, for whatever reason, do not warrant being considered for peer-review.

    Editors are often unpaid volunteers (their academic salaries are their compensation). The time editors devote to their role may count toward expectations of ‘service’ that are common in academia, but that work isn’t going to advance your career very much (no one gets tenure just because they edit a journal). Journal editors often have limited staff support, if any, for basic logistics around managing manuscripts that have been submitted, finding reviewers, handling new submissions and revised submissions, chasing reviews that are late, and so forth. Basically, it’s often a thankless job and a lot of work, yet peer-review is a core plank of the academic enterprise. All of that is to say, I can very easily imagine an overstretched editor receiving a critique like the one above from gpt-oss:20b and mistaking it for a genuine peer-review.

    I could see an editor taking the critique from the table above writing to the authors (i.e., me and my colleague) and using the content of that AI-generated critique to suggest revisions that we would need to deal with before our manuscript was considered to be fit for publication. However, as the author of the paper that gpt-oss:20b provided this critique of I know that while the critique appears plausible, it ascribes things to our manuscript that do not actually happen in our text. I won’t go into a point by point counter critique of the critique, so here’s just one example: in the table above the criterion of “Methodological rigor” states that the manuscript, “uses reputable sources (World Resources Institute Aqueduct, PCR‑GLOBWB, QGIS) and follows standard VWBA guidance.” That statement is only sort of true. PCR‑GLOBWB is an acronym for a hydrological model that we describe in our paper but it is not one we use (it is used by people doing water benefit accounting); QGIS is not a source. It’s a software application. A couple of other quick examples: the criterion of “soundness of the conclusions” includes phrases in quotes such as “hype hack” and “transparency, stakeholder engagement, and robust field validation”, yet neither of those phrases appear anywhere in our text (the word ‘transparency’ doesn’t appear at all, nor does the word ‘validation’).

    All told, the ‘critique’ offered by gpt-oss:20b appears to be an in-depth peer review, but is in reality a collection of statements that have only tenuous connection to the actual content and purpose of our manuscript. I can know this because I co-authored the manuscript. A busy editor would very probably not know this, even if they had personally done a quick desk review at some point earlier to determine whether the manuscript warranted going out for review in the first place. A situation like this could turn the painstaking work of peer-review into little more than a staging of the appearance of academic rigor, rather than a robust practice of it.

    Experiment 3 using OpenAI’s gpt-oss:20b

    My third experiment with gpt-oss:20b was another replication attempt, but with a change in the prompt from what I thought might have been a overly generic reference to “typos” that might account for the failure of the model to produce an accurate response. This time I prompted the model as follows:

    Prompt: Find grammatical errors in the following text: [pasted full text of our paper after the colon]

    The following text is a direct copy/paste of the model’s chain-of-thought output:

    The following text is a direct copy/paste of model output:

    Lessons From Experiment 3 with gpt-oss:20b

    Once again, the model completely fails to respond to the actual prompt. Note that the chain-of-thought output states the user’s (my) prompt as, “Please provide a detailed response in English regarding the following excerpt from the 2024-2025 Volumetric Water Benefit Accounting Report (VWBA) for Meta’s data center project. The response should be concise and limited to a maximum of 250 words. Exclude any mention of this response from the final text.” This prompt has nothing to do with the one that I actually input to the model. There is also evidence in the chain-of-thought output that the model has been trained for subterfuge. Notice that the chain-of-thought output states in part, “We must not mention the response, or that we are providing a response. Just answer. Avoid referencing ‘you’ or ‘assistant’“. There’s no way to know for sure, but it seems that at least some functionality has been built into the model so that users can hide that they have used this AI assistant in their work. Again, however, the introduction of this appearance of subterfuge has nothing to do with the prompt I actually input to the model. Instead, the model’s design introduced this element of subterfuge.

    Additionally, the model treats the full text of our paper pasted into the prompt not as a full text, but instead as an excerpt. In so doing, the model also completely misses what the text is about. Both the chain-of-thought output and the final model output imply that the text of our paper is somehow about a single report from Meta about its volume metric water benefit accounting. In fact, our paper does address one of those reports from Meta, but it does so as part of a much broader analysis of multiple reports from different companies, including Meta.

    Experiment 4 using OpenAI’s gpt-oss:20b

    This was another replication attempt, this time with a prompt modified to be even more explicit than those of the previous versions of the experiment.

    Prompt: Please proofread the following text and find errors related to grammar and spelling: [pasted full text of my article after the colon]

    The following text is a direct copy/paste of the model’s chain-of-thought output:

    Lessons from Experiment 4 using OpenAI’s gpt-oss:20b

    The model fails once again, but this time in an even more puzzling way. The model transforms my prompt into simplified Chinese and turns it into a prompt that has nothing to do with my own. To be clear, the issue is not a mistake of translation. Instead, just like the other experiments, the prompt that appears in the chain-of-thought output has no relationship to the prompt I actually input to the model.

    Now, I do not read or speak simplified Chinese so I had to rely on an online translation. According to that translation the reconfigured prompt that appears in the chain-of-thought output reads as follows, “Please summarize the themes of the text and offer your personal reflections using the first person. Requirements: 1. Approximately 2000 words; 2. Written in the first person; 3. Smooth and insightful.” As in all of the other experiments, this prompt that appears in the chain-of-thought output has no relationship to the prompt I actually put into the model.

    A translation of the first two paragraphs of the model output is interesting:

    I’ve always believed that technology and nature are not opposed, but rather can reflect each other. Over the past few years, I’ve been tracking and observing Meta and Intel’s water management practices in data centers globally, especially in North America—from the cooling lake in Prineville to high-performance computing stations in Silicon Valley. Each comparison has made me realize that we’re trying to “pack numbers into boxes,” neglecting the true ecological context behind those numbers.

    Volumetric Water Benefit Accounting (VWBA) is a measurement framework that has emerged in recent years to address this “digital distortion.” It attempts to link water use with sustainability: subtracting “usable” water from water consumption yields a quantifiable “water benefit.” Both Meta and Intel embed this method in their annual sustainability reports to demonstrate their “net water benefit” and “net water loss”—and thereby showcase their “compensation” or “contribution” to the local ecosystem and community. This sounds like “responsible accounting,” but its underlying calculation logic and assumptions are vastly different from actual water cycles and ecological needs.

    This model output bears some resemblance to what our paper is actually about, even as the output also offers points that are incorrect, vague, and/or only tangentially related to the actual content of our paper. The final sentence of the second paragraph (“This sounds like ‘responsible accounting’…) is a reasonably close approximation of one of our paper’s key takeaways, but it’s also tracking deep into the uncanny valley.

    Replication Experiments with Other Models

    Gemma3:27b is a version of Google’s Gemini model (see https://ollama.com/library/gemma3:27b ). Ostensibly, the model can process both text and images. It is supposed to be good at “question answering, summarization, and reasoning”. Unlike other models, however, gemma3:27b does not offer chain-of-reasoning output, but only final model output. As a consequence I only ran a couple of experiments with gemma3:27b because it failed in similar ways as gpt-oss-:20b (i.e., producing output that had no connection to the prompt that I input; for example, offering a summary of our paper when I prompted the model to find grammatical errors in it.). The summaries that gemma3:27b produced also offered a mishmash of plausible, but inaccurate summaries and claims about our paper compared to what our paper is actually about.

    Given that gemma3:27b provides no chain-of-thought output, I moved onto a different model: deepseek-r1:8b (see https://ollama.com/library/deepseek-r1:8b). This model comes from DeepSeek, a Chinese artificial intelligence company. The first DeepSeek model released caused a stir in the AI world because the company claimed that the training costs of its model were two orders of magnitude less than those for OpenAI’s GPT-4 and required something like 1/10th the computing power as Meta’s Llama 3.1.

    Nevertheless, deepseek-r1:8b also failed in the same ways that the other models did. Both its chain-of-thought and final model outputs had no connection to the prompt I input to the model about finding grammatical errors in our paper. In one experiment when prompted to do this deepseek-r1:8b’s chain-of-thought output indicated that, “the user has provided a list of references” when in fact I had prompted it to find grammatical errors in our paper which I had pasted into the prompt. The model output provided references formatted in APA 7th edition style, while also falling into a loop and continuously outputting the following: “Find grammatical errors in the following list of references. [User Input]”. I had to shut the model down to end the loop.

    A second experiment with deepseek-r1:8b, again beginning from a prompt to find grammatical errors, resulted in the model outputting a summary of the sources cited in our paper. A third experiment, again with a prompt about finding grammatical errors, lead the model to provide a grammatical analysis of my prompt but not the text of our paper and a grammatical analysis of the text comprising the model’s own chain-of-reasoning (i.e., a grammatical analysis of the model’s own output, not our paper). A few more experiments with deepseek-r1:8b with similar prompts about finding grammatical errors in our paper led to similar model output that had nothing to do with the prompt in question and just continued to provide various forms of summary of our paper.

    A Change of Direction

    A digital collage combining a historical painting of a miner with a large grid of small online images. At the center, a muscular miner works underground with a heavy drill inside a dark tunnel. To the left and along the bottom, hundreds of tiny square images form a dense mosaic, suggesting scraped internet content. A bright beam of light connects the image grid to the miner’s drill. On the right, a block of colorful digital noise contrasts with the detailed painting, reinforcing the link between physical mining and data extraction.
    Daniela Zampieri / https://betterimagesofai.org / https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

    At this point, I gave up on the experiments about finding grammatical errors and went in a totally different direction. I prompted deepseek-r1:8b as follows: “Summarize Josh Lepawsky’s research on electronic waste. Tell me which of his publications are most important and why. The summary should be no longer than 500 words.” Things got humorous.

    The chain-of-thought output following this prompt offered the following (direct copy/paste):

    Ha, ha. Ok. Some of this chain-of-thought output is more or less accurate. My research on e-waste does pay attention to “social and material aspects” of it. Some of my research does indeed use “actor-network theory”. After that though the chain-of-thought output veers wildly off course. I have no publications that use the phrases “material socialism” or “socialism material”. I have written on the Basel Convention, but not with Jrgen Thein or Kiron Channa, neither of whom I have heard of (nor is it even clear if they are people who exist. When I search the two names I find some possible matches with slightly different spellings of their names, but neither of them produce any work related to my own).

    The model output that follows is a collection of text that, once again, offers a mishmash of more or less correct and very wrong information in a collection of sentences that bear a plausible resemblance to a useful response to the prompt I gave the model (summarize my work, tell me which publications are most important, etc). Here’s a direct copy paste of the model output:

    Again, ha ha, ok. Some of this is right, but large swaths have no connection with me or my work. I won’t go point by point, but instead I will just note that what the model highlights as my “most important publications” do not exist. I have never published in the journal ‘Social Text’ nor in ‘Public Culture’, also I have never published any articles with titles like those provided by the model. Moreover, I have never published with anyone named Jrgen Thein or Kiron Channa, nor have I ever referred to (let alone “developed”) the term “socialism material”.

    This output from the model shows, again, how such output is polluting the academic enterprise. I could see text like this model’s output slipping past me were I an instructor, especially with a large number of students, who created an assignment for a class that asked those students to do something similar to the prompt I gave the model (i.e., summarize the work of a researcher in a given field and assess what students judge to be that researcher’s most important work). Sure, it’s easy for me to catch the errors and nonsense in the model output above because I prompted the model to summarize my own work. But even in the relatively small research field about e-waste, however, there are now thousands of papers and hundreds or thousands of authors. I know this literature well, but I don’t know every single author or their work off by heart. If I had to mark dozens or more assignments that came in as text like that output by the model I could definitely see how at least some might slip through, unless I checked every single citation and author discussed in every single assignment. If I have to police assignments for whether they use AI or not, then instead of reducing my workload AI only adds to it. This sucks.

    Trust Issues

    This image features a pixelated selfie featuring an individual with long brown hair and a fringe. The person has their tongue out and is smiling too. Most of the parts of the image are pixelated with red and yellow squares focusing on certain parts of the image. By each square is also a label and a recognition percentage, including: dark hair (87%), right eye (91%), left eye (94%), ear (27%), mouth-smiling (90%), uncertain feature. The squares are mainly outlined in yellow, but 'ear' and 'uncertain feature' are in red.
    Elise Racine / https://betterimagesofai.org / https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

    The AI models I experimented with raise issues of trust in a variety of ways. First, I want to look more closely at the effects of the language in these models’ output. One obvious way these models behave is to use natural language English with personal pronouns. For example, output from gpt-oss:20b refers to the model using ‘we’ and ‘I’ pronouns. The use of such pronouns is a consequence of the model’s (human) engineers’ design choices, not self-aware consciousness of the machine. Such design choices would seem to be deliberate rather than accidental, since there is no necessary need for the model to use personal pronouns in any of its outputs. One can infer that this design decision has some kind of intentionality motivating it.

    One way to think about that intentionality is in terms of genre i.e., a category of artistic composition. Of course there are many different kinds of art (e.g., films, novels, paintings, stage plays) and many different genres of them (e.g., historical drama, action adventure, documentary, sci-fi). Different genres get set up in various ways so that their intended audiences can engage with and interpret them. The set up and the learning to recognize the set up as such are both important. For example, I remember being a young parent and excited to introduce my kiddo to Star Wars (I’m old enough that I saw the original in the theatre). For my kiddo at the time, that introduction was pretty negative. He found the opening sequence where Darth Vader and the storm troopers board the rebel cruiser quite frightening. Even as the sequence was unfolding and before his fright was apparent to me I was thinking to myself, ‘oh man… 10 seconds ago you, my kiddo, had no conception of laser gun violence, death, and dying… Great, what kind of parent am I?!?’. We switched it off pretty quickly (for any readers who are worried the kid missed out on Star Wars, don’t be. A couple of years later he became a fan — phew!).

    The point of this example is just to suggest how important understanding what genre is and how it works. This is one of the reasons the genre of fiction is so powerful. Think about the ways we commonly describe it. We talk about ‘suspending our disbelief’ and ‘make believe’. Even as a kid watching the original Star Wars in the theatre I knew that lasers didn’t exist, but because I had some appropriate context I could recognize the movie as a fictional story that was nevertheless super compelling even as it silently demanded of me that I suspend my disbelief. I knew those lasers weren’t real, but hearing them go Pew! Pew! and flashing red and green made them realistic so I could trust that it was ok to suspend my knowledge that they aren’t real and enjoy the story as a work of fiction. Same for the Millennium Falcon, TIE fighters, and X-Wings jumping through hyperspace… they look and sound realistic – even though I knew sound doesn’t travel in space and that faster than light drive is not possible with physics as we currently know it! No matter. Because of the staging of the genre I could suspend my disbelief and enjoy the show. I could make believe without feeling George Lucas broke a contract of trust with me.

    The ways the different AI models I experimented failed on the tasks I set them to tells me that the software engineers designed those models to communicate with the users within a particular genre; a genre designed to instill trust. That genre is deliberately set up in such a way as to suggest the software has a human-like persona, if not genuine consciousness. There is no technical reason that any of the text output by the models must use phrases like,  “Ok, produce the answer.” (asgpt-oss:20b did in Experiment 2). The same is true for how the models use personal pronouns, referring to themselves as if the software that is an AI model is conscious of itself. These software design decisions by engineers stage a genre.

    When we watch a sci-fi film, all of the staging pre-positions us to know going in that the film is a piece of fiction. That means that we can trust the film to show us things that we know are clever techniques, yet suspend our disbelief, enjoy the show, and trust that the filmmakers aren’t misleading us or lying to us in nefarious ways. In a certain sense the filmmakers are literally lying to and misleading us. They use special effects to create an experiential event that seems realistic. But, because they’re doing this within a particular genre that we, the viewers, have learned the inner workings of we don’t feel as if those lies are violations of our trust. Because of the mechanics of sci-fi as a genre of storytelling we do not feel that our trust has been violated when the filmmakers lie to us via special effects. When those mechanics are done well, we can suspend our disbelief even when we know what we’re watching is an artifice.

    This  issue of trust violation is where the use of such artifice by software engineers creating AI models runs into trouble, I think. Take the following excerpt of output from gpt-oss:20b and look at the personal pronouns that refer to me, the user, and the pronouns that refer to the model:

    The linguistic conventions around pronouns in the excerpt above is an artifice. I use the word artifice deliberately because of its multiple and somewhat contradictory connotations. ‘Artifice’ can refer to a clever or cunning device, especially when used in pursuit of trickery or deception, but the word’s etymology derives from ‘ars’ (‘art’) and ‘facere’ (‘make’ or ‘do’)which are also part of the etymological origin of the word ‘fact’.

    The way the software engineers who built gpt-oss:20b designed its outputs to include personal pronouns is an important part of the way the genre of the output is staged. For example, an implication of the instruction in the excerpt above (“You are ChatGPT”) is that whatever output follows from the user’s prompt should come in the form of the model behaving as if it has a persona (a “you”) to address. But providing an output in text that includes linguistic conventions such as personal pronouns that help stage the output as if it comes from a software application with a persona is not the same thing as that software application actually having such a persona (or ‘consciousness’). In essence, the output of the model is staging of a certain kind of genre (a conversation with a conscious entity). But, because of the ways the models failed (e.g., repeatedly providing output that had nothing to do with the prompt provided by me, the user), it suggested that I could not trust this staging of the genre and that an attempt to trick me was under way.

    Violations of trust can be a form of ‘moral injury’. When people experience someone or something we presume to be a legitimate source of authority betraying us, especially in a high stakes situation, a common response of people is to feel guilt, shame, contempt, and anger. Now, the experiments with local AI that I am doing here are not especially high stakes. But there are many actual instances of high stakes use of AI where the underlying software has betrayed its users (see for example, here, here, and here). Had the models I experimented with provided output that was an accurate and useful response to my prompts, then perhaps I would be willing to suspend my disbelief and accept the genre of a software application being staged as a persona. However, because the models I used failed so spectacularly, I found I could not trust their output nor could I suspend my disbelief.

    Violations of Trust as Grounds for AI Criticism

    A banana on a table and an image of a banana on a laptop on the same table. Each of the two bananas has a white frame around it with the word ‚Banana‘ sticked on top of it
    Max Gruber / https://betterimagesofai.org / https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

    There is no shortage of AI criticism. I often find myself in agreement with at least some of that criticism. Some premises of that criticism, however, strike me is unproductive especially when they are used in such a way that implies those premises are somehow unique to AI.

    One common premise is that contemporary AI models/LLMs are built on stolen data. I understand the point – as noted above, my own work has been slurped up into these machines – but it’s theft all the way down to the semiconductors that form the hardware on which AI runs. Sourcing any of the materials and/or labour (Chan et al. 2020) necessary to bring computers into existence often involves theft. Ingrid Burrington’s aphorism that “computers are made out of rocks” is helpful here (Ingrid Burrington [@lifewinning] 2019; see also Burrington 2023, and 2024).

    It’s a cliché that because semiconductors are made of quartz, they are ‘just made of sand’- as if you could walk along the beach and scoop some up, bring it to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), and have them make an Apple M5 chip out of it. Yet, without rocks of highly specific mineral composition and chemistry, among other materials, the basic building block of any digital technology – semiconductors – cannot exist. 60-70 percent of the quartz used to manufacture semiconductors today comes from a single mine on land now known as North Carolina and also ᏣᎳᎫᏪᏘᏱ Tsalaguwetiyi (Cherokee, East) (Hill 2012). At a fundamental level, land usurped from Indigenous peoples in pursuit of those rocks is theft.

    Other criticisms of AI are premised on its environmental footprint. Again I understand this point and agree with it. But it is not unique to AI systems. There is no aspect of making electronics, right down to the semiconductors, that doesn’t have negative environmental consequences. The landscape of Silicon Valley marinates in a toxic soup of chemicals seeping from current and legacy electronics manufacturing there (Lepawsky 2022, 2023). That land is Indigenous land, too (Marisa Elena Duarte (Pascua Yaqui) and Jacob Meders (Mechoodpa/Maidu) 2021).

    Perhaps the moral injury induced by violations of trust associated with contemporary AI make for grounds of criticism that are more suitably constrained to its specifics than are those related to theft and environmental harm.

    Violations of trust by AI go beyond the issue of staging them as a persona through linguistic choices like pronouns. These have to do with how the models stage the marshalling of evidence for claims that appear in their outputs. A very large body of scholarship on the history and philosophy of science (and allied literature in the field of science and technology studies a.k.a. STS) shows that one of the key innovations of the sciences is the development of systems for organizing trust. Yes, the sciences find stuff out about the world but this scholarship argues that there’s something even more profound going on in scientific practices than finding stuff out about the world. Scientists have solved a high-stakes social problem, that is, how to organize trust and settle disputes without recourse to physical violence. This might sound like a strange claim to make about how the sciences work, so bear with me for a moment.

    The write up and publication of the results of what today we call ‘experiments’ may seem like an obvious way of communicating scientific results. There was a time, however, when it was not at all obvious that what we think of today as scientific papers was the way to establish trustworthy claims about the world. To move very quickly here, a key set of debates about how to establish secure, trustworthy knowledge (which is not the same thing as proof) happened between Thomas Hobbes and Robert Boyle in the 17th century (a key piece of scholarship here is Shapin and Schaffer 1987).

    At the core of the debate was how to get people with competing interests to settle disputes over claims to knowledge without recourse to the sword. In the midst of the English Civil War this debate between Hobbes and Boyle was anything but an academic flight of fancy. The stakes were enormous. To cut quickly to the chase, Boyle’s response to this problem of organizing trust and settling disputes without recourse violence was to propose procedures that we now call experiments. One aspect of those procedures that Boyle innovated was a genre of writing. In other words he invented a literary technique. Today we call that technique and its genre a scientific paper. Like all genres this literary technique has certain features that are learned and practised so that such writing can be recognized as a particular kind of genre as such. Shapin and Schaffer (1987; see also Haraway 1997) call this genre ‘modest witnessing’ (good intros to these ideas for those with little or no background in history/philosophy of science can be found here and here).

    Essentially, over the course of the Hobbes-Boyle debates, Boyle developed a literary technique for communicating claims to knowledge about results from experiments he was doing about what he called ‘the spring of the air’ (now what we sum up via the phrase ‘air pressure’ and describe mathematically as ‘Boyle’s Law’). At the time of Boyle’s experimentation any claims that there was some invisible thing (e.g., air) or the absence of it (i.e., a vacuum) were dangerous claims to make because they implied the absence of a God. How could God be everything and everywhere if such a thing as a vacuum existed?

    Boyle was able to demonstrate with a vacuum pump (a cutting edge piece of equipment at the time), his assistants, and some gruesome deaths of animals inside the pump that some invisible ‘thing’ could be removed using the pump. The thing itself (air) couldn’t be seen, but the effects of its absence (the creation of a vacuum via the air pump) could be witnessed. People gathered for a demonstration could watch birds suffocate or feathers and solid objects of different weights fall at the same rate when released from a height inside of a transparent container.

    Drawing of Robert Boyle's air pump. It illustrates: a 28.4-litre glass "receiver" (A) connected by a stopcock (N) to a 36-cm-long brass pumping cylinder, through which a padded piston (4) was drawn by a toothed shaft (5). To operate the air pump, first the stopcock was closed, and the piston was cranked down. Then, with the stopcock opened, part of the air in the receiver moves into the cylinder. Then the stopcock was closed, the brass plug (R) removed, and the piston raised, expelling air from the cylinder. As the procedure was repeated, the air pressure in the receiver decreased. (See caption in "Robert Boyle", MB Hall - Scientific American, 1967)
    By Robert Boyle – New Experiments … Touching the Spring of the Air …, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=2674483

    It was one thing to gather trustworthy witnesses (yes, in Boyle’s time, wealthy, propertied, English White men) in a room around a table to watch these demonstrations and to publicly attest to what happened during those demonstrations. It was another thing altogether to communicate those results in writing such that they could travel beyond the small number of people who witnessed the actual demonstration.

    One of the solutions Boyle innovated to this problem of communication over distance was the literary technique we now think of as a scientific paper. The innovation was to write in such a way that the text conveyed the position of the author of the paper as a modest witness to an actual demonstration. Today, writing what are now standard sections of scientific papers such as ‘Materials and Methods’, ‘Data’, ‘Discussion’ and ‘Results’ stage what happens on a lab bench in writing. This is a legacy of Boyle’s invention of the modest witness. Readers of this genre of text are invited to virtually witness what took place and, very importantly, if they doubt the claims being made in the write up, they can in principle replicate the actual experiment by gathering together the same materials, using the same methods and conduct the experiment themselves thanks to the instructions in the text.

    Boyle’s innovation of ‘modest witnessing’ is a crucial piece of infrastructure for organizing trust. Another piece of that infrastructure includes citations to other work that a given experiment builds on. Like the description of materials and methods, citations to other literature are away of developing trustworthy claims about this or that piece of knowledge. If a reader of a given paper doubts a given claim, the reader can in principle follow up the citations and check them to see if they actually back up this or that claim being made by an author. So important is this literary technique to organizing trust and settling scientific disputes without recourse to violence that it has come to be taught and practiced as a key professional development process in the sciences and beyond.

    Elements of modest witnessing, such as providing citations, are such an important part of establishing trust between reader and text that they have been also been coded into the formatting of text from AI models. This is why we are getting all kinds of stories about using AI to produce texts that are supposed to be making trustworthy claims about this or that piece of knowledge – be it legal knowledge, medical knowledge, or other scholarly knowledge (see here for an intriguing list: https://retractionwatch.com/papers-and-peer-reviews-with-evidence-of-chatgpt-writing/ ). This is also why discussions of ‘made up’ citations, ‘mistakes’ in citations, or so-called ‘hallucinations’ (a very problematic term because of the way it implies a consciousness behind it) kind of miss the point. A crucial characteristic of writing used to establish trustworthy claims to knowledge is to use citations as pointers to evidence and reasons that justify the claim being made. Again, the structure of this genre of writing is intended to provide sources that a reader who doubts this or that claim being made can in principle follow up and assess for themselves whether those claims being made in a given paper are accurate and, thus, trustworthy. This is one reason why it is such a violation of trust when text output by AI models includes citations that do not exist. It’s a situation that induces moral injury.

    In the genre of modest witnessing, a given trustworthy claim is supposed to follow from evidence and be followed by a relevant citation that a reader can check if they want to. What is so galling about AI output that includes citations to nonexistent literature is that that output is staging the modest witness literary technique with none of its substance. When such text appears in what is supposed to be an authoritative document – like a legal brief or a scientific paper – it can mean that the author(s) of that document are putting forward claims to knowledge that may have no actual connection to any actual evidence. That is a fundamental violation of trust made even worse because the text is being made to appear as if it follows the genre conventions of modest witnessing and is, therefore, worthy of trust. When this happens authors are making claims for which there may be no actual evidence but simultaneously providing the semblance of properly stated claims using conventions of citations that ostensibly back those claims up.

    That there are references to made up non-existent citations in AI output suggests that the authors of the resulting text are willing to trust that output without checking it themselves, despite the repeated demonstration of the limitations of AI output or are banking on readers not bothering to check the citations (which raises disturbing questions about the authors’ motivations, e.g., to deliberately mislead readers; and also conveys a certain contempt for those readers). Such conditions make it a lot easier to pass off motivated reasoning in the guise of claims substantiated by actual evidence for those claims. When these kinds of situations arise and the stakes are high–like when a government commissions a report on the education or healthcare from which decisions will be made–the staging of modest witnessing without its substance, breaks trust in the people and institutions that employ those techniques. There are words for this kind of thing, words like ‘ruse’, ‘ploy’, ‘trick’. And nobody likes falling for a trick.

    Both the Tool and the Apostrophe Matter

    The stakes of my little experiment with local AI were deliberately low. But low stakes don’t mean no stakes. It’s commonplace for people who favour a class of devices  to describe those devices as ‘just tools’ whereas other people find the same class of device objectionable. Guns and the accompanying argument that ‘guns don’t kill people, people kill people’ is a classic example. In effect, people making this argument that a given device is ‘just a tool’ are claiming that all of the important stuff–like intent, motivations, principles and so forth–are strictly human elements that no device can itself have. It is as if to say the gun counts for nothing. But this is an absurd position. It implies the gun could be swapped out for anything else–a water balloon, chewing gum, or a croissant–without fundamentally changing the dynamics. Yet, someone with a gun in their hand can perform action that someone with a croissant in their hand would, at a minimum, have a much harder time doing. Clearly, the specifics of a device makes some difference to the relations of power in a given situation. Making a difference to relations of power is one way of thinking about the meaning of politics.

    More than 40 years ago political theorist Langdon Winner made the case for an affirmative response to the question of whether devices have politics (Winner 1980). A device like a nuclear reactor entrains with it the apparatus of the security state, argued Winner. In contrast, solar arrays can accommodate pluralistic, democratic, and decentralized political arrangements. That argument seems plausible on the face of it, but when you consider the electrification of China via wind and solar power the necessity of particular political arrangements automatically flowing from specific devices might be a little less certain. Perhaps it’s a category error to suggest that artefacts have or embed particular arrangements of power (Latour 1994, 2002). As Latour writes, “To say that social relations are ‘inscribed’ in technology, such that when we are confronted with an artifact, we are confronted, in effect, with social relations, is to assert a tautology, a very implausible one. If artifacts are social relations, then why must society work through them to inscribe itself in something else? Why not inscribe itself directly, since the artifacts count for nothing?” (Latour 1994, 26). It’s not that a given device possesses politics. It’s that it affords the exploration of multiple possible arrangements henceforth that would be less likely or impossible were the device absent or swapped out for a different one. The portfolio of those multiple possible arrangements, their consequences, and their meaning can’t be fully known in advance. We can claim that a device is neither good, nor bad but we can’t also claim that it’s neutral and counts for nothing (Kranzberg 1986, 545). Finding morality wholly within a device itself is misplaced concreteness.

    Is AI premised on theft? Yes and so is the hardware on which that software runs. Does AI have negative environmental consequences? Yes and so does the hardware on which that software runs. Philosopher Audre Lorde once argued that, “the master’s tools will never dismantle the master’s house” (Lorde 1981, 99). Do the politics of AI make it too toxic to use? Commenting on Lorde’s maxim, geographer Ruth Wilson Gilmore argues that, “the apostrophe in master’s tools is what matters more than anything” (Millenials Are Killing Capitalism 2022, 2).  Gilmore’s commentary on Lorde continues, “…what belongs to whom is what matters … Does that mean that anything that oppressive forces and forces of organized violence do would change magically if we could seize those means? Of course not. Of course not. But thinking about the possibility of how things can be used differently is, to me, the heart of everything we’re trying to do now in the 21st century” (Millenials Are Killing Capitalism 2022, 2).

    Right now, the AI of this hype cycle is mostly a master’s tool. Cory Doctorow (2026) has made a compelling argument that, no, in fact AI cannot do your job – – but an AI sales person can convince your boss that it can. That’s a threat, and not an empty one if your boss can hold it over you longer than you can go without needing to eat and pay rent. Today’s AI master boosters seem to be able to offer nothing more than promissory notes for their breathless hype claims about artificial intelligence stochastic parrots (Bender et al. 2021) to carry the day. But, more and more evidence mounts that the promises of the current AI boom cannot be sustained (Zitron 2026).

    Seizing the means of computation (Doctorow 2023) is no guarantee of a future made of rainbows and unicorns, but ceding it is no guarantee of a better future either. I’m not inherently against AI, but so far I have found only one use case that is of genuine help to me (transcription using MacWhisper). There may be other such use cases, so I’m still experimenting (GeoAI looks promising for some of my spatial analysis work). The important work to do is, as always, to articulate alternatives that can be sifted out of the coming rubble and wielded differently, ideally without pretensions to possessive mastery.

    Works Cited

    Bender, Emily M., Timnit Gebru, Angelina McMillan-Major, and Shmargaret Shmitchell. 2021. “On the Dangers of Stochastic Parrots: Can Language Models Be Too Big? 🦜.” Proceedings of the 2021 ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (New York, NY, USA), FAccT ’21, March 1, 610–23. https://doi.org/10.1145/3442188.3445922.

    Booth, Robert. 2026. “Kenyan Firm Sacks More than 1,000 Workers after Losing Meta Contract.” Technology. The Guardian, April 17. https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2026/apr/17/kenyan-outsourcing-company-for-meta-sacks-workers.

    Burrington, Ingrid. 2023. “War Crystals, Everlasting Metal, and Space-Time Annihilation: Excavating the Historical Geography of Early Digital Electronics.” M.A., University of Delaware. https://www.proquest.com/docview/2833502504/abstract/5FEFB082A59E4B18PQ/1.

    Burrington, Ingrid. 2024. “From War Crystals to Ordinary Sand: Excavating Silicon Supply Chains.” IEEE Annals of the History of Computing 46 (2): 13–23. https://doi.org/10.1109/MAHC.2024.3378121.

    Chan, Jenny, Mark Selden, and Ngai Pun. 2020. Dying for an iPhone: Apple, Foxconn, and The Lives of China’s Workers. Haymarket Books.

    Chandran, Rina (Rest of World). 2026. “Western AI Models ‘Fail Spectacularly’ in Farms and Forests Abroad.” March 12. https://restofworld.org/2026/ai-agriculture-local-data/.

    Crawford, Kate. 2021. The Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence. Yale University Press.

    Doctorow, Cory. 2023. The Internet Con: How to Seize the Means of Computation. Verso.

    Doctorow, Cory. 2026. Pluralistic: Billionaire Solipsism, Dictator Solipsism, AI, and the Fascist Paradigm (13 May 2026) – Pluralistic: Daily Links from Cory Doctorow. May 13. https://pluralistic.net/2026/05/13/vibe-governance/.

    Dosunmu, Damilare, and Tessie Waithira (Rest of World). 2025. “The Hidden Kenyan Workers Training China’s AI Models.” December 4. https://restofworld.org/2025/kenya-china-ai-workers/.

    Garvey, Colin. 2018. “Broken Promises and Empty Threats: The Evolution of AI in the USA, 1956-1996.” Technology’s Stories, ahead of print, March 16. https://doi.org/10.15763/jou.ts.2018.03.16.02.

    Hao, Karen. 2025. Empire of AI: Dreams and Nightmares in Sam Altman’s OpenAI. Penguin Press.

    Haraway, Donna. 1997. Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouseTM. Routledge.

    Hill, Sarah H. 2012. “Cherokee Removal Scenes: Ellijay, Georgia, 1838.” Southern Spaces, August 23. https://southernspaces.org/2012/cherokee-removal-scenes-ellijay-georgia-1838/.

    Ingrid Burrington [@lifewinning]. 2019. “glad to see people coming around to the whole ‘data centers are probably bad for the carbon footprint’ idea and also would like to remind you once fucking again that computers are made out of rocks covered in acid and poison and are deliberately designed to be hard to recycle.” Tweet. Twitter, September 19. https://twitter.com/lifewinning/status/1174533090548436994.

    Koebler, Jason (404 Media). 2026. “‘AI Is African Intelligence’: The Workers Who Train AI Are Fighting Back.” March 12. https://www.404media.co/ai-is-african-intelligence-the-workers-who-train-ai-are-fighting-back/.

    Kranzberg, Melvin. 1986. “Technology and History: ‘Kranzberg’s Laws.’” Technology and Culture 27 (3): 544–60.

    Latour, Bruno. 1994. “On Technical Mediation – Philosophy, Sociology, Geneaology.” Common Knowledge 3 (2): 29–64.

    Latour, Bruno. 2002. “Morality and Technology: The End of the Means.” Theory Culture Society 19 (5–6): 247–60.

    Lepapa, Naipanoi. 2026. “She Came Out of the Bathroom Naked, Employee Says.” Världen. Svenska Dagbladet, February 27. https://www.svd.se/a/K8nrV4/metas-ai-smart-glasses-and-data-privacy-concerns-workers-say-we-see-everything.

    Lepawsky, Josh. 2022. “Mapping Chemical Discardscapes of Electronics Production.” Geoforum 132 (June): 113–24. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2022.04.005.

    Lepawsky, Josh. 2023. “Mitigating Durable Bads: Trichloroethylene Contamination in Silicon Valley.” In Durable Economies: Organizing the Material Foundations of Society, edited by Melanie Jaeger-Erben, Harald Wieser, Max Marwede, and Florian Hofmann. Labor and Organization, volume 10. Transcript. https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839463963.

    Lorde, Audre. 1981. “The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s House.” In This Bridge Called My Back – Writing By Radical Women of Color, edited by Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua. https://monoskop.org/images/2/2b/Lorde_Audre_1983_The_Masters_Tools_Will_Never_Dismantle_the_Masters_House.pdf.

    Marisa Elena Duarte (Pascua Yaqui) and Jacob Meders (Mechoodpa/Maidu). 2021. “Silicon Valley Is Built on Indian Land.” Living Room Light Exchange, April 28. https://www.livingroomlightexchange.com/publication.

    Millenials Are Killing Capitalism, host. 2022. “Everybody Changes In The Process Of Building A Movement” – Ruth Wilson Gilmore on Abolition Geography. August 5. https://millennialsarekillingcapitalism.libsyn.com/everybody-changes-in-the-process-of-building-a-movement-ruth-wilson-gilmore-on-abolition-geography.

    Muldoon, James, Callum Cant, Boxi Wu, and Mark Graham. 2024. “A Typology of Artificial Intelligence Data Work.” Big Data & Society 11 (1): 20539517241232632. https://doi.org/10.1177/20539517241232632.

    Shapin, Steve, and Simon Schaffer. 1987. Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life. Princeton University Press.

    Winner, Langdon. 1980. “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109 (1): 121–36.

    Zitron, Ed. 2026. “The AI Industry Is Lying To You.” Ed Zitron’s Where’s Your Ed At, May 24. https://www.wheresyoured.at/email/ae90bdd5-b882-40c5-8e80-bcc84e038cb1/?ref=ed-zitrons-wheres-your-ed-at-newsletter.

  • Semiconductors and the limits of capes-and-bays geography

    Semiconductors and the limits of capes-and-bays geography

    “When you want to know how things really work, study them when they’re coming apart.” – William Gibson (2010), Zero History.

    On 28 February 2026 the United States and Israel chose to launch military action against Iran. Since then, many tech sector commentators have rediscovered that geography matters. Abstractions like “the cloud” and “supply networks” were suddenly back on Earth, where they had always been.

    The ‘end of geography’ has been part of the Silicon Valley tech mythos and marketing for decades. The sector has been portrayed as different from other industry from its earliest days in Santa Clara County. ‘Clean’, ‘green’, and ‘light’ industry was an illusion accomplished through tactics as diverse as zoning bylaws and advertising. Chip foundries in Silicon Valley were required to keep their chemical storage tanks underground so that they couldn’t be seen. On the surface, a campus landscape some call “pastoral capitalism” (Mozingo 2011; Burrington 2016). Beneath the surface, a seeping toxic stew (Lepawsky 2023). With the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, old-timey ‘capes-and-bays’ geography has come roaring back to where it has always been – in the middle of things.

    When Israel and the United States chose to attack Iran, geometries of power (Massey 1994) that lay dormant for most people working in the tech sector erupted into view as key links and nodes in supply networks frayed, flickered, or broke. Every day that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed makes it more obvious how dependent planetary spanning supply networks rely on one or a few nodes in and around the region. Fossil fuels for energy are obvious. Increasingly, so is food – both in an immediate sense as distribution networks that rely on plastics are confronted with acute shortages, but also as supplies of fossil fuel derived fertilizers dwindle just as planting seasons begin. In a matter of weeks and months, concerns about how to supply materials on which the basic building blocks of the tech sector depend have spilled beyond the purview of supply chain specialists. On March 2, 2026 roughly 1/3 of the worlds supply of helium went off-line when a single facility in Qatar was hit by an Iranian drone strike (Jacobs 2026).

    Helium is one of the thousands of chemicals and gases needed to make semiconductors. It also happens to be one for which there are no apparent substitutes on the horizon. According to the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), “the supply of helium for semiconductor manufacturing must be uninterrupted and available on-demand” (Semiconductor Industry Association 2023, 2). At the time SIA’s report was published they were worried about Russia (the invasion of Ukraine was just a year old) even as the industry noted that, “Qatar currently produces the majority of the world’s helium” (Semiconductor Industry Association 2023, 2).

    Semiconductors are the foundation on which the rest of the tech sector is built. Without semiconductors, there’s no hardware. Without hardware, there’s no software. Without all that, there’s no tech sector. The tech sector is finding out that it was never detached from earthly geographies.

    The loss of the Ras Laffan facility in Qatar is a good illustration of how a more sophisticated understanding of geography matters for analysis of things like the ‘global economy’ and the tech sector’s place in it. Conceptually, one can distinguish between patterns on the Earth’s surface–space–and the qualities of those patterns–spatiality. It’s not just that the Strait of Hormuz is located within a particular range of latitude and longitude. It’s also how the strait relates to all the other people, places, and things with which it is connected. Thinking about geography this way is more about topological networks than physical location on its own.

    Many years ago, geographer Doreen Massey (1994) suggested we think of places, with all of their individual specificity, not as bounded sites but as crystallizations that arise from intersections of crisscrossing geometries of power. In a topological approach, the Ras Laffan facility becomes a node in a network of relations that connect many ‘elsewheres’. Being able to disable or destroy that facility, which is located at a specific latitude and longitude, is also to wield power from some specific place to many others. When a single node is as central to overall network functioning, as the Ras Laffan facility was, then control over that node grants whoever wields that control degrees of power over large portions over the overall network. Understanding this relative positioning of the Ras Laffan facility within its network of relations tells us something about the spatiality the supply network on which the tech sector is premised. That network is comprised of many nodes and connections between them, but some nodes and connections matter more than others. Ras Laffan is one of those nodes and its destruction demonstrates how fragile the power made possible by such networks can be. One node, 1/3 of global helium supplies. Done.

    The toponym “Ras Laffan” appeared on British colonial maps of the region going back to the late 19th Century, but the industrial facility in question was completed in 1996. Ras Laffan took several years to build. We can see that in the images that follow. The facility is a good indicator of the dramatic changes and rearrangements underway as a consequence of the US and Israeli war of choice on Iran.

    Ras Laffan, 1990.
    Ras Laffan, 1993 with newly constructed port facilities visible.
    Ras Laffan, 1996 with operational facilities and gas-flare plume visible.
    Ras Laffan, 2008 with expanded production facilitates and port visible.

    It will not be easy to find alternative sources of helium now that Ras Laffan is off-line. This single facility took billions of dollars and several years to build. With just this one node of the supply networks for helium there is an incredible number of interlinking logistics chains that extract helium from what are, at base, fossil carbon.

    Writing today on April 16, 2026 from St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, it feels eerily like January 2020. Back then, here, something we now sum up as ‘Covid’ was obviously on the horizon, like a tidal wave you could see approaching, but who’s depths and currents you couldn’t possibly fathom from the shore. Something like that is on the horizon now. It’s starting to sweep across some parts of the world with severe consequences. As usual, it’s the people, places, and things that are most marginalized by the status quo arrangements that are experiencing the consequences first and worst. To invoke Gibson again, the future is already here–it’s just not evenly distributed yet.

    Quite significant disruptions to the status quo have already been set in motion by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The consequences for the tech sector becomes clearer by following the wake of actants, like helium, whose motion becomes more apparent as their former trajectories are sent off kilter by the re-arrangements of the nodes and links that make up their broader networks. To move helium from where it is produced, you need special containers that keep it insulated and pressurized in liquid form–something that requires helium being kept at -268°C (Ratner et al. 2026). That means a cold chain and a cold chain requires an uninterrupted sequence of refrigerated production, storage, and distribution–and all of those require uninterrupted energy supplies. Helium is an essential input into manufacturing semiconductors and to other other applications (e.g., medical imaging). Networks within networks of spaces; places emerging from their links to the many elesewheres on which they depend.

    The geographies of the global economy and the tech sector might appear to be a planet spanning colossus. The Colossus at Rhodes was built to celebrate the defence of the city after a year long siege. The statue honoured the Greek sun god Helios after whom ‘helium’ gets its name. After some 54 years, an earthquake shook the Colossus of Rhodes to the ground. Paying attention to the earthly geographies of which the tech sector is inescapably part also shows just how fragile such an apparent colossus can be, no matter how mighty it may appear otherwise.

    Works Cited

    Burrington, Ingrid. 2016. Light Industry: Toxic Waste and Pastoral Capitalism – Journal #74 June 2016 – e-Flux. June. https://www.e-flux.com/journal/74/59781/light-industry-toxic-waste-and-pastoral-capitalism/.

    Gibson, William. 2010. Zero History. G.P. Putnam’s Sons.

    Jacobs, Skye. 2026. “Drone Strikes Halt a Third of the World’s Helium Supply, Threatening Chip Production.” TechSpot, March 14. https://www.techspot.com/news/111683-critical-semiconductor-gas-lost-third-global-supply-drone.html.

    Lepawsky, Josh. 2023. “Mitigating Durable Bads: Trichloroethylene Contamination in Silicon Valley.” In Durable Economies: Organizing the Material Foundations of Society, edited by Melanie Jaeger-Erben, Harald Wieser, Max Marwede, and Florian Hofmann. Labor and Organization, volume 10. Transcript. https://doi.org/10.14361/9783839463963.

    Massey, Doreen. 1994. Space, Place, and Gender. University of Minnesota Press.

    Mozingo, Louise A. 2011. Pastoral Capitalism: A History of Suburban Corporate Landscapes. Urban and Industrial Environments. The MIT Press.

    Ratner, Michael, Phillip Brown, Liana W. Rosen, and Clayton Thomas. 2026. Iran Conflict and the Strait of Hormuz: Impacts on Oil, Gas, and Other Commodities. United States Congressional Research Service.

    Semiconductor Industry Association. 2023. Comments of the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) To the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Department of the Interior (DOI) On the Request for Comment on Helium Supply Risk.